Directory:Logic Museum/Siger of Brabant/Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 20-21

Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 20-21

Introduction

The passages below are questions 20 and 21 of Siger of Brabant's questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics, concerning the problem of propositions with non-existent subjects. Although Siger is probably better known for his discussion of the question whether the proposition 'Man is an animal' is true if no individual men exist (not available in the Logic Museum), the passages here concern two related questions, namely whether (question 20) a thing named is necessarily what it is signified to be by the name (thus, is man necessarily a rational animal, given that 'man' means rational animal), and whether (question 21) a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing it signifies exists or not.

The questions are connected with one another, and divided the philosophers of the middle and late thirteenth century along party lines. Siger argued, as here, that when a name has a definition (such as 'rational animal', in the case of man), the definition is predicated necessarily of whatever has the name. Thus 'every man is an animal' is necessarily true because the definition of man is predicated of man.

Question 20 is whether, if a noun signifies 'X', it is necessary that anything denoted by the noun is X. Siger argues that what a name signifies is said necessarily of what is signified by the name. Therefore, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily a two-footed animal. Question 21 is whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] exists or not. Siger argues that a name has a 'single understanding' or single meaning, whether or not there is anything in reality that corresponds to the name. Another reason is that a name signifies one thing according, as it were, to its logical nature [ratio], and so there is always a single nature, there is a single signification. Therefore, although in reality there is not a single thing that we can predicate both being and non being, nevertheless in the name's logical nature there is one thing of which both can be predicated.

On the question of whether 'Man is an animal' is true if no individual men exist (not included here), Siger claimed that the hypothesis is absurd because in the Aristotelian perspective of nature the human species is eternal (Van Steenberghen 1977, pp. 265-9). Whereas Aristotle suggests that words signify concepts, Siger, it is objects that are the primary signification of words. Common terms signify the essence of things, rather than the other determinations that accompany a thing in real existence. The essence is the foundation of the signifying unity of the common term. A concept is thus the secondary object of the term, co-signified by it (cf Bazan 1980, Putallaz and Imbach 1997, p. 86).

We have no precise date for when the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicae was completed. It is unlikely to have been before 1265 (when Siger was only 25), nor after 1276, when Siger appeared on a charge of heresy, then fled to the papal court in Italy. It was probably completed in the early 1270's.

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Latin	Latin
[224] Quaestio 20 QUAERITUR UTRUM HOMO SIGNIFICAT ANIMAL BIPES NECESSE SIT IPSUM ESSE HOC	Question 20. Whether 'man' signifies two-footed animal, it is necessary that he be this.
Consequenter circa rationem ARISTOTELIS quaeritur utrum, si homo significat animal bipes, necesse sit ipsum esse animal bipes; et idem intelligatur in aliis. Et videtur quod sic, ratione faciente fidem, quia quod quid est aliquid dicitur de illo cuius est et necessario : quid enim magis veriusque dicetur de aliquo, quam id quod ipsum est? Sed illud quod nomen significat est quod quid est eius quod significatur, et non aliquod accidens eius. Quare illud quod nomen significat necessario dicitur de eo quod significatur per nomen. Quare, si homo significat animal bipes, necessario homo est hoc.	Consequently, concerning this argument [rationem] of Aristotle, it is asked whether, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily a two-footed animal, and the same may be understood in other [cases]. And it seems that it is so, by reason creating faith, because what-something-is is said of that of that of which it is, and necessarily, for what is said more truly of anything, than what that thing itself is? But what the name signifies is the what-it-is of what it signifies, and not some accidental property of it. Wherefore, what a name signifies is said necessarily of what is signified by the name. Wherefore, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily this.
Contra : quaedam est definitio quae dicit quod est, quod significatur per nomen, et tamen non est definitio indicans quid est [225] esse rei, ut dicitur IIє Posteriorum, ut definitio tragelaphi, si igitur praedicare illud quod significatur per nomen non est nisi praedicare significatum, et ipsum quandoque non habet quod quid est, manifestum quod non oportet significatum per nomen esse hoc necessario.	On the other hand, something is a definition when it says what it is that is signified by a name, and yet it is not a definition indicating what the being of a thing is, as is said in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, for example the definition of 'goat-stag'. If, accordingly, predicating what is signified by the name is nothing except predicating what is signified, and that thing sometimes does not have the what-it-is, it is manifest that what is signified by a name does not have to be so [hoc] necessarily.
Item, Caesar significat hominem, et tamen Caesar non est homo. Quod significet hominem patet, quia Caesar idem significat quod prius ipso existente et non existen[f. 109ra]te, et ipso existente significabat hominem : significabat enim individuum hominis et de ratione individui est species.	Likewise, 'Caesar' signifies a man, yet Caesar is not a man. That it may signify a man is clear, because 'Caesar' signifies the same that it did before, with him existing, and with him not existing, and with him existing it signified the man, for it signified the individual man, and the species is of the nature of the individual.
QUAESTIO 21. UTRUM NOMEN IDEM SIGNIFICET ET UNIVOCE RE EXISTENTE ET NON EXISTENTE	Question 21. Whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] exists or not.
Gratia huius quaeritur utrum nomen idem significet et univoce, re existente et non existente. Videtur quod sic. Nomen constituens intellectum unum nunc et prius, non significat aequivoce nunc et prius, sed univoce; sed nomen re existente et non existente unum intellectum constituit; quare significat idem et univoce.	On account of this, it is asked whether a name signifies the same thing, and unequivocally, when the thing exists in reality, and does not exist in reality. And it seems that it does. A name establishing a single understanding now and then, does not signify equivocally now and then, but unequivocally. But a name establishes a single understanding with the thing [signified] existing or not existing, wherefore it signifies the same, and unequivocally.
Contra: significatio una non aequivoca debet esse unius sicut intellectus unus est unius; sed Caesare existente et non existente, Caesar non habet intellectum unum: non enim est intellectus eius intellectus unius; similiter nec significatio. Considera enim ad res, nihil invenies de quo posses enuntiare primo quod est, deinde quod non est, sicut ista enuntiatur de Socrate : nihil enim unum in re manet nisi subiectum mutationis, quod [226] nihil est nisi in potentia; huius autem unius non est significatio; quare &c.	On the contrary side: a single signification, not equivocal, ought to be of one thing just as one understanding is of one thing. But with Caesar existing and not existing, 'Caesar' does not have a single understanding, for the understanding of him is not the understanding of a single thing, similarly not the signification. For turn your consideration [considera .. ad] to things. You will find nothing of which you can assert first that it is, and then that it is not, in the way that this is asserted of Socrates. For no single thing remains in reality unless it is the subject of change, which is nothing except potentially, but of this single thing there is no signification, wherefore &c.
Solutio. Ad primam quaestionem dicendum quod si nomen significat aliquid, sive sit res naturae sive rationis, sive fictum sive verum, id quod significat nomen necessarium est praedicari de significato per nomen : significat enim nomen quod quid est eius cuius est nomen, ut praeostensum est; quid autem verius praedicatur de aliquo quam suum quod quid est? Est tamen advertandum propter rationem ad oppositum quod, cum nomen aliquod habeat definitionem dicentem quid significat nomen, ista definitio praedicatur necessario de eo quod significatur per nomen. Dicit enim AVICENNA quod illud potest habere rationem rei vel entis et quidditatis quod non est extraneum, sed non potest habere rationem rei vel entis quod {est extraneum} omnino : ratio enim rei qua res est res, non est nisi quod est. Et hoc etiam vult ARISTOTELES : dicit enim in principio huius IV quod non ens esse non ens dicimus, per hoc probans esse ens aliquo modo. Definitio igitur rei non dicit quod quid est rei extra animam, sed aliquo modo rei sive in anima sive extra animam.	Solution (1). To the first question it must be said that if a name signifies something, whether it be a thing of nature or a thing of reason, that which the name signifies is necessarily to be predicated of what is signified by the name, for the name signifies the what-it-is of the name, as was shown before. But what is more truly predicated of something than its what-it-is? And yet it is to be noticed, on account of the opposing argument, that when a name has a definition saying what the name signifies, that definition is predicated necessarily of what is signified by the name. For Avicenna says that something can have the nature of a thing or of a being, and of a quiddity that is not extraneous, but cannot have the nature of a thing or of a being that is altogether extraneous, for the nature of a thing by which the thing is a thing, is nothing unless it exists. And this is also as Aristotle would have it, for he says in the beginning of book 4 that we say a non being is a non being, proving by this that it is a being in some manner. Accordingly, a definition of the thing does not mean [dicit] the what-is-it of the thing outside the soul, but in some way [the what-is-it] of the thing, whether it is in the soul or outside it.
Et cum dicitur quod definitio dicens quid significat nomen, non dicit quod quid est, verum est rei extra animam, idest quod [227] quid est in re extra, quia ei non competit tale esse: sed dicit esse et quod quid est secundum esse quod sibi competit : ideo &c.	And when it is said that a definition saying what a name signifies, does not mean that which-it-is, it is true of a thing outside the soul, i.e. that which-it-is in outside reality, because such being does not belong to it, but rather it means being and that which-it-is according to the being which belongs to it.
Et cum dicitur quod Caesar significat hominem, et tamen non est homo, dicendum quod Caesar non significat hominem simpliciter, sed temporis determinati : sic enim habuit substantiam et definitionem. Unde transmutabile est secundum substantiam et definitionem, quod secundum eam tempore mensuratur. Et ideo praedicatum necessarium non habuit, sicut nec esse necessarium : significat enim singulare, et hoc de ratione sua est hic et nunc. Unde non significat hominem simpliciter, sed Caesarem, et quia ipse est temporis determinati, ideo non est homo nisi in tempore determinato ; et ideo potest Caesar, quando Caesar non est, non significare hominem.	And when it is said that 'Caesar' signifies a man, and yet he is not a man, it is to be said that 'Caesar' does not signify a man without qualification, but at a determinate time. For thus he had a substance and a definition. Wherefore a transmutable thing exists according to a substance and a definition, which is measured by a time according to it. And for that reason he did not have a necessary predicate, just as he [did not have] necessary being, for ['Caesar'] signifies a singular thing, and this is of its nature here and now. Wherefore it does not signify a man without qualification, but Caesar, and because he exists at a determinate time, for that reason he is not a man except at a determinate time. And for that reason 'Caesar', when Caesar does not exist, cannot signify a man.
Solutio. Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod nomen significat idem et univoce re existente et non existente. Et ratio una est quia unus manet intellectus de re, ipsa existente et non existente ; quare et significatio. Alia ratio est quia nomen significat unum secundum rationem, et ideo univoce semper eius quod significatur per nomen est una ratio, licet ipsum transmutetur secundum esse ; quare, cum significet nomen ipsum secundum rationem unum, idem et univoce significabit.	Solution (2). To the second question it must be said that a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, with a thing existing or not existing. And one reason is that the understanding of the thing remains one, with it existing or not existing, wherefore also the signification. Another reason is that a name signifies one thing according to a logical nature [rationem], and for that reason there is always a single logical nature unequivocally of what is signified by the name, although that may be changed according to being, wherefore, since a name signifies a single thing according to logical nature, it will signify the same thing and unequivocally.
Et cum arguitur quod non est dare aliquid unum in re, re [228] existente et non existente, dicendum quod significatio una debet esse unius secundum rationem et intellectum. Et quia quando cessat entitas rei non cessat intellectus eius, ideo nec unus intellectus nec una significatio : ex quo enim significatio non refertur immediate ad rem (sic enim cessaret cessante esse rei), sed refertur ad rem prout res refertur ad intellectum, et cessante esse non cessat intellectus, ideo nec significatio. Et ideo, quamvis in re non sit unum recipens praedicationem essendi et non essendi, tamen in ratione unum utrumque recipit.	And when it is argued that it is not [possible] to grant a single thing in reality, with the thing existing and not existing, it must be said that a single signification ought to be of a single thing according to logical nature, and understanding. And because, when the entity of a thing ceases to be, the understanding of it does not cease to be, for that reason neither [does] a single understanding nor a single signification [cease to be]. For from this the signification is not referred directly [immediate] to the thing, according as the thing is referred to the understanding, and in ceasing being, the understanding does not cease, and for that reason neither does the signification. And for that reason, although in reality there is not a single thing receiving predication of being and non being, still in logical nature [ratione] one thing receives both.